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I. Introduction 
This Article considers judicial approaches to the adjudication of 
the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)1 
 
† Associate Professor, Director, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Co-Director, 
LLM in Human Rights Programme, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.  I am 
grateful to Holning Lau for his helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Elizabeth Lui 
and Lili Ullmann for their assistance.  
       1 Some have critiqued the LGBT acronym as overly narrow since it may not account 
for cultural variabilities and not all sexual orientation or gender identity minorities 
necessarily identify as LGBT.  See Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Discrimination, 2 COMP. DISCRIMINATION L. 1, 4 (2018). For the sake of convention and 
consistency, however, this Article uses “LGBT” throughout and sometimes “sexual 
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persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong).  Hong Kong provides a 
notable case study of litigation strategies and court responses in a 
jurisdiction open to international human rights law.  Sodomy was 
decriminalized in 1991 under the former British colonial regime, 
and, since 2006, Hong Kong courts have decided a number of cases 
concerning a range of issues including transgender marriage,2 
different ages of consent for vaginal and anal intercourse,3 other 
discriminatory criminal provisions,4 restrictions on television 
broadcasts about relationships between gay men,5 the rights of 
incarcerated transgender persons,6 and the rights of same-sex 
couples.7  Other cases are still working their way through the system 
and future challenges are anticipated as advocates continue to 
pursue a persistent litigation strategy.8 
 
orientation” and “gender identity” when referring to particular protected characteristics or 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
 2 See W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); W 
v. Registrar of Marriages, [2012] H.K.C. 88 (C.A.) (H.K.); W v. Registrar of Marriages, 
[2010] 6 HKC 359 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 3 See Leung v. Sec’y for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.A.) (H.K.); Leung v. 
Sec’y of Justice, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 4 See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung & Lee Kam Chuen, 
[2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 196 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
 5 See Cho Man Kit v. Broad. Auth., [2008] H.K.E.C. 783 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 6 See Navarro Luigi Recasa v. Comm’r of Correctional Services, [2018] 4 
H.K.L.R.D. 38 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
 7 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324 (C.F.A.) (H.K.); 
Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2018] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 84 (C.A.) (H.K.).  
The Court of Final Appeal is expected to consider the last two issues concerning civil 
service spousal benefits and joint tax filing on appeal in 2019. 
 8 See MK v. Government of the HKSAR [2019] H.K.C.U. 53 (C.F.I.); See e.g., 
Raquel Calvarho, Three Transgender Men Challenge Hong Kong Policy Requiring Full 
Sex Change before They are Legally Considered Male, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 
9, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/community/article/2127525/three-
transgender-men-challenge-hong-kong-policy-requiring [https://perma.cc/54DV-9T3Q]; 
Chris Lau, Two Gay Men Mount First Legal Challenges to Hong Kong Laws Banning 
Same-sex Marriage, with Court Giving Their Applications Green Light to Proceed, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-
crime/article/2180551/two-gay-men-mount-first-legal-challenges-hong-kong-laws 
[https://perma.cc/5FN8-WXA4]; Chris Lau & Kimmy Chung, Woman Takes 
Unprecedented Step to Advance LGBT Cause in Hong Kong and Sues Government over 
Civil Partnerships Ban, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 24, 2018), 
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With some exceptions, in most of these decisions the courts 
have at least partially dismantled discriminatory policies.  At the 
same time, however, government and legislative efforts have lagged 
behind.9  For example, although international human rights bodies 
have regularly called on the Hong Kong authorities to introduce 
anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sexual orientation 
and gender identity, the government has thus far resisted.10  The 
limited policy changes that have occurred have been in direct 
response to judicial review, and even then there have been delays 
on certain issues.11   
Based on a study of these judgments, read in the context of 
developments in international human rights law, this Article 
considers prospects for upcoming challenges to the lack of access 
for same-sex couples to legal recognition in the form of same-sex 
marriage or civil partnerships.  Several factors could influence the 
trajectory of these cases and LGBT rights in Hong Kong generally.  
First, local public opinion has shifted toward greater acceptance of 




9 See Carole J. Petersen & Kelley Loper, Equal Opportunities Law Reform in Hong 
Kong: The Impact of International Norms and Civil Society Advocacy, in REFORMING LAW 
REFORM: PERSPECTIVES FROM HONG KONG AND BEYOND (Michael Tilbury et al. eds., 
2014). Amy Barrow and Joy Chia observe that “[g]iven the inhospitable legislative 
context, strategic litigation has proven to be the primary vehicle for legal reforms crucial 
to the advancement of LGBT rights.” See Amy Barrow & Joy L. Chia, Pride or Prejudice: 
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Religion in Post-Colonial Hong Kong, 46 H.K. 
L.J. 89 (2016). 
10 See, e.g., Concluding observations of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao), ¶ 78, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.107 (May 13, 2005). 
11 In response to the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in W v Registrar of 
Marriages, which recognized the right of a post-operative transgender woman to marry 
in her acquired gender, the government established an Inter-departmental Working 
Group on Gender Recognition (IWG) in January 2014 “to consider whether it is 
necessary to introduce legislation and incidental administrative measures to deal with 
issues concerning gender recognition in Hong Kong.” See Home, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL 
WORKING GROUP ON GENDER RECOGNITION, https://iwggr.gov.hk/eng/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/LH77-LEDA]. Since then, the IWG has completed a comparative study 
and conducted a public consultation in 2017, but it has not yet produced a report or made 
any publicly available recommendations to the government.   
 12 See Lau, supra note 1; see also Holning Lau, Charles Lau, Kelley Loper, & Yiu-
tung Suen, Support in Hong Kong for Same-sex Couples’ Rights Grew Over Four Years 
 
276 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
global trends.  Studies indicate that rights-friendly law reform, such 
as recognition of same-sex marriage, is more likely to occur in 
societies with more tolerant attitudes.13 
Developments in international human rights law in this area 
could also generate further momentum.14  In Hong Kong, with its 
relatively open society and common law legal system that relies on 
precedent and permits the courts to cite comparative authority,15 
international legal innovations should continue to shape the 
outcomes of future cases.  The judiciary’s proclivity to rely on, and 
be persuaded by, international human rights law suggests prospects 
 
(2013-2017): Over Half of People in Hong Kong Now Support Same-Sex Marriage, in 
BRIEFING PAPER, CENTRE FOR COMPARATIVE AND PUBLIC LAW, UNIVERSITY OF HONG 
KONG FACULTY OF LAW; UNC LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER (2018); Kelley Loper, 
Holning Lau, Charles Lau, Yiu-tung Suen, Public Attitudes Towards Transgender People 
and Anti-Discriminatory Legislation, CTR. FOR COMP. AND PUB. L., (December 2017, 
revised June 2018). 
 13 See generally Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Backgrounder on Same-Sex 
Marriage Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons 
[https://perma.cc/CS7C-ZQSW]; ENZE HAN & JOSEPH O’MAHONEY, BRITISH 
COLONIALISM AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY: QUEENS, CRIME AND 
EMPIRE 82–86 (1st ed., 2018) (explaining, in their study of the criminalization of 
homosexuality in former British colonies, that factors influencing decriminalization have 
included openness to the outside world, access to information about global trends, and 
acceptance of international human rights norms. They also point out that decriminalization 
of same-sex conduct in Hong Kong was influenced by the introduction of the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance in 1991 in response to public concerns about the future protection of human 
rights in the run up to the territory’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997). 
 14 See Carole J. Petersen, International Law and the Rights of Gay Men in Former 
British Colonies: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore, 46 H.K. L.J. 109, 109–29 (2016); 
Carole J. Petersen, Values in Transition: The Development of the Gay and Lesbian Rights 
Movement in Hong Kong, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 337 (1997); Carole J. Petersen, 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the Strategic Use of 
Human Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process, 14 ASIAN-PAC. L. & 
POL’Y J. 28, 28–83 (2013); Barrow & Chia, supra note 9; Joy L. Chia & Amy Barrow, 
Inching towards Equality: LGBT Rights and the Limitations of Law in Hong Kong, 22 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 303 (2016); Phil C. W. Chan, The Lack of Sexual Orientation and 
Anti-discrimination Legislation in Hong Kong: Breach of International and Domestic 
Legal Obligations, 9 THE INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 199, 199–208 (2005). 
 15 XIANGGANG JIBENFA art. 84 (H.K.) [Hong Kong Basic Law] (promulgated by 
Order No. 26, Pres. of China, Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997) [hereinafter Basic 
Law] (although the Basic Law is a national law enacted by the National People's Congress 
of the People’s Republic of China, it has the status of superior law in Hong Kong and is 
considered Hong Kong’s constitutional instrument). 
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for progressive responses to issues such as gender recognition, civil 
unions, and/or same-sex marriage.  International and comparative 
human rights law has had a significant influence on the Hong Kong 
courts’ adjudication of constitutional rights generally16 and LGBT 
issues specifically.  The domestic incorporation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)17 has reinforced 
judges’ tendency to draw on international and comparative human 
rights jurisprudence for guidance.18  In addition to comparative 
domestic cases, courts have cited interpretive materials produced by 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies, such as the United Nations 
(UN) Human Rights Committee19 and judgments rendered by 
regional judicial organs, mainly the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR).20 
Another key factor is how the courts continue to elaborate an 
emerging substantive equality doctrine.  This doctrine is grounded 
 
 16 See, e.g., Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the 
Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37 H.K. L.J. 299 
(2007); Albert H.Y. Chen, International Human Rights Law and Domestic Constitutional 
Law: Internationalisation of Constitutional Law in Hong Kong, 4 NTU L. REV. 237 
(2009); Simon N. M. Young, Constitutional Rights in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, 
27 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 67, 81–82 (2011); David S. Law, Judicial 
Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2015). 
        17 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(1), adopted Dec. 
19, 1966, U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 18 See Young, supra note 16 (noting that from 1997-2007, 75% of all of the Court of 
Final Appeal’s citations to case authorities in rights cases were to non-Hong Kong cases, 
48% were decisions made by U.K. courts, and 8% were citations to decisions of 
international courts and tribunals. Young observes that the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights was especially influential and most of the U.K. case authorities 
involved the 1998 Human Rights Act which incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights into British law). 
 19 The independent, expert body tasked with monitoring states’ implementation of 
the ICCPR. Hong Kong is party to seven core U.N. Human Rights instruments including 
the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 
ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, the 
Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Each of these treaties has its own monitoring body that 
reviews states parties’ periodic reports, makes recommendations in concluding 
observations, and issues other interpretive materials including general comments and 
views (jurisprudence) on individual communications. 
 20 Petersen, supra note 14, at 48–50. 
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in international norms which mandate attention to real disadvantage 
and remedies for discriminatory impact.21  In contrast to formal de 
jure “equality before the law,” substantive equality takes context 
into account and requires states to identify and eliminate laws, 
policies, and practices that have de facto discriminatory effects.22  I 
argue that the right to equality and non-discrimination, when 
understood in this substantive sense, has particular relevance for 
furthering LGBT rights.  This is especially true in jurisdictions 
where formal distinctions in law based on sexual orientation—such 
as anti-sodomy provisions—have been removed and constitutional 
issues now primarily involve relationship and family rights.  Much 
of the discrimination facing LGBT persons in these environments is 
less direct and more multidimensional, often intersecting with 
marital status, gender, and other aspects of identity.  It also involves 
stigma, prejudicial attitudes, and structures that may require 
transformative, positive measures. 
The jurisprudence examined in this Article illustrates how these 
factors are playing out in Hong Kong as the courts prepare to 
consider one of the first same-sex marriage cases in Asia.23  Hong 
Kong’s constitutional equality doctrine has developed 
predominantly, though not exclusively, in the course of LGBT 
rights adjudication and reflects interpretations by international 
human rights authorities.  As such, the Hong Kong experience 
serves as an instructive example of the potential of global human 
rights norms, chiefly the right to equality, to advance LGBT claims 
in the domestic sphere.  It could have comparative value for other 
jurisdictions where courts also participate in and are influenced by 
a growing global judicial conversation and consensus on LGBT-
related norms. 
To set the stage for subsequent analysis of the salience of the 
right to equality, Part II summarizes the international legal position 
on other rights that have applied to LGBT claims.  International law 
has increasingly elaborated the relevance of core global and 
 
 21 See BEVERLEY BAINES & RUTH RUBIO-MARIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE GENDER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 13–14 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rubio-Martin eds., 
2004). 
 22 See Jennifer Hainfurther, A Rights-Based Approach: Using CEDAW to Protect the 
Human Rights of Migrant Workers, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 843, 862 (2009). 
23 See Lau, supra note 8.  In May 2017, the Taiwan Constitutional Court ruled that 
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry in Taiwan. 
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regional human rights instruments, despite the absence of explicit 
references to sexual orientation or gender identity.  Part III then 
examines the content of the right to substantive equality and non-
discrimination.  It draws in part on interpretive materials produced 
by human rights treaty monitoring bodies to clarify the elements of 
a substantive equality theory and the legal tools that might be 
helpful to achieving its aims.  While these materials are not strictly 
speaking binding on states, they are regarded as highly persuasive. 
Part IV provides a brief overview of Hong Kong’s constitutional 
framework and the significance of international human rights law.  
It then identifies features of a budding substantive equality doctrine 
in Hong Kong.  In line with the approach of the international bodies 
discussed in Parts II and III, Hong Kong courts have recognized 
sexual orientation as a particularly invidious ground of 
discrimination.  They have also employed a strict proportionality 
test when determining the validity of justifications for distinctions 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  They have also 
accepted that fulfillment of the right to equality does not necessarily 
require equal treatment and, in fact, may sometimes necessitate 
differential treatment.  This insight, along with its corollary that 
facially neutral measures can in some circumstances amount to 
unconstitutional discrimination, opens up possibilities.  
Furthermore, the courts have acknowledged a concept of dignity 
that they could build on to address the harms that LGBT persons 
frequently experience, thus strengthening equality’s concern with 
impact. 
Part V then considers the implications of this analysis of 
substantive equality for resolving LGBT rights issues going 
forward.  The focus is on relationship rights, especially prospects 
for recognition of same-sex marriage and/or civil partnerships in 
upcoming challenges.24  At the same time, it reflects on the 
likelihood that certain international bodies— which have produced 
reasoning the Hong Kong courts have found persuasive—could 
revisit their current positions on same-sex marriage.  A reading of 
the same-sex marriage opinions of the ECHR and the Human Rights 
Committee reveals an inadequate grasp of the capacity of 
substantive equality.  In contrast, in a 2017 advisory opinion, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) embraced 
 
      24 See Lau, supra note 8. 
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substantive equality in support of same-sex marriage.25  The 
untapped potential of other international human rights enforcement 
mechanisms, however, coupled with innovations in the ECHR 
jurisprudence, suggests strategies for progressing LGBT rights in 
Hong Kong and beyond. 
II. LGBT Rights in International Law 
The following provides a brief summary of the international 
legal position on the rights of LGBT persons as interpreted by 
global and regional human rights monitoring bodies and judicial 
organs.26  This area of jurisprudence is advancing rapidly as these 
institutions and domestic courts are asked to resolve questions about 
the extent and nature of LGBT rights.  As Langford points out, the 
numbers of LGBT rights cases brought before international bodies 
has grown considerably since the early 1990s and even more rapidly 
since 2010.27  At the same time, claimants’ rate of success has also 
increased.28 
By definition, human rights must be guaranteed to everyone 
regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, simply by virtue 
of being human.29  None of the general or specialized global or 
regional human rights instruments,30 however, explicitly mention 
these markers of identity.  Various enforcement bodies, such as the 
 
      25 State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights 
Derived from a Relationship between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of 
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1, of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17]. 
 26 This overview considers only a sample of issues. It is not intended to be a complete 
account of relevant international norms which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 27 See Malcolm Langford, Same-Sex Marriage in Polarized Times: Revisiting Joslin 
v. New Zealand (HRC), in INTEGRATED HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE 119, 122 (Eva Brems 
and Ellen Desmet eds., 2017). 
 28 Id. (noting that “[t]he data is based on our Sexual and Reproductive Rights 
Lawfare Database.”).  
 29 See, e.g., What are Human Rights?, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3ZK9-YKPF]. 
 30 These include the general and specialized core United Nations (U.N.) human rights 
treaties and regional instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, see 
infra note 37, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights. 
 
2019 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 281 
ECHR, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the IACHR, have 
nevertheless clarified that international human rights standards 
apply in the LGBT context.  They have elaborated on state 
obligations and associated violations such as the criminalization of 
homosexual sex, denial of family and relationship rights to same-
sex couples, discrimination in access to economic, social and 
cultural rights, and the failure to recognize a change of gender.  Soft 
law documents, like the Yogyakarta Principles,31 have also been 
influential and cited by regional and domestic courts.32  Especially 
helpful provisions when addressing the types of harm frequently 
affecting LGBT people include: the rights to be free from torture, 
other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and arbitrary 
deprivation of life; the rights to freedom of expression and 
association; and the rights to privacy, family life, and marriage.  
Given the wide range of issues and space constraints, this summary 
is not exhaustive.  It contemplates, however, a sampling of these 
norms in order to provide a point of comparison for the subsequent 
examination of the significance of the right to equality and non-
discrimination. 
The Committee against Torture, the monitoring body for the 
Convention against Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or 
 
      31 See The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 7 (2007), 
available at http:// 
www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/569U-LJRA] 
[hereinafter Yogyakarta Principles]; see also The Yogyakarta Principles Plus 10: 
Additional Principles and State Obligations on the Application of International Human 
rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex 
Characteristics to Complement the Yogyakarta Principles, (2007), available 
at http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A5_yogyakartaWEB-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P34Q-8KA8] [hereinafter Yogyakarta Plus 10]. 
  For a discussion of these principles and their significance, see, e.g., Michael 
O’Flaherty and John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS L. REV. 207 (2008); 
see also David Brown, Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles, 31 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 821 (2010); See generally Andrew Park, Yogyakarta Plus 10: A Demand for 
Recognition of SOGIESC, 44 N.C. J. OF INT’L L. 223 (2019) (discussing the creation and 
subsequent impact of the Yogyakarta Principles).  
 32 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25; see also Naz Found. v. Gov’t 
of N.C.T. of Delhi, WP(C) No.7455/2001, Del. H.C. (India). 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment, has expressed concerns about 
the ill-treatment of persons based on their sexual orientation or 
gender identity.33  The ECHR has also decided related cases.34  The 
Committee against Torture has explained that Article 3 of the 
Convention requires states to refrain from expelling or returning 
individuals to countries where substantial grounds exist for 
believing they would be in danger of torture because of their sexual 
orientation.35  The Human Rights Committee and the ECHR have 
taken similar positions when interpreting an implicit duty of non-
refoulement (non-return) in Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR36 and 
 
 33 For example, in its concluding comments on Iraq’s state report, the Committee 
expressed concern “at reliable reports of attacks, some of which have resulted in deaths, 
against individuals perpetrated on grounds of their real or perceived sexual orientation or 
gender identity.” Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Concluding Observations of the Comm. 
Against Torture: Seeking Accountability and Demanding Change: A Report on Women’s 
Rights Violations in Iraq, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1 (2015). 
 34 See, e.g., M.C. and C.A. v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (deciding that the 
inadequate investigation of violent attacks on participants in a gay pride parade, was a 
violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights). See also Identoba 
and Others v. Georgia, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. 17 (2015). 
 35 Article 3(1) provides that “No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or 
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S 85.  
  In its views on several individual communications, the Committee Against Torture 
has held that States violated article 3 for denying asylum to LGBT persons at risk of torture 
because of their sexual orientation if returned to their counties of origin. See, e.g., Stewart 
v. Canada, Views, Human Rights Comm., 58th Sess., No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996); see also Comm. Against Torture [CAT], 62nd Sess., 
General Comment No.4 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the 
Context of Article 22, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/4 (2018). 
 36 See Human Rights Comm. [HRC], 2187th Sess., General Comment No. 31: The 
Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May. 26, 2004) (“States parties must not extradite, 
deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by 
articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant.”). See also M.I. v Sweden, Human Rights Comm., 108th 
Sess., No. 2149/2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2149/2012 (2013). See generally M.K.H. 
v Denmark, Views, Human Rights Comm., 117th Sess., No. 2462/2014, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/117/D/2462/2014 (2016) (involving a claim by an asylum seeker from 
Bangladesh who feared torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if 
returned to Bangladesh). 
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Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.37  With 
regard to transgender rights, the Committee Against Torture has 
suggested that requiring a transgender person to undergo surgery or 
forced sterilization before obtaining legal recognition of their 
acquired gender could amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.38 
The rights to be free from torture, inhumane treatment and 
arbitrary deprivation of life, however, only apply to particularly 
egregious violations, and the threshold for determining what 
constitutes such conduct is substantial.39  Although states cannot 
derogate from these obligations40 and the prohibition against torture 
is absolute, these norms have limited capacity to address many of 
the other harms experienced by LGBT persons. 
 
        37 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 222. See, e.g., I.K. v. Switzerland (no. 21417/17); M.E. v. Sweden 
(no. 71398/12).  
 38 See CAT, 1368th Sess., Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of 
China with respect to Hong Kong, China, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 (Feb. 2, 
2016). In its concluding observations the Convention against Torture expressed concern 
“about reports that transgender persons are required to have completed sex-reassignment 
surgery, which includes the removal of reproductive organs, sterilization and genital 
reconstruction, in order to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity” and 
recommended that Hong Kong “[t]ake the necessary legislative, administrative and other 
measures to guarantee respect for the autonomy and physical and psychological integrity 
of transgender and intersex persons, including by removing abusive preconditions for the 
legal recognition of the gender identity of transgender persons, such as sterilization.” See 
generally HOLNING LAU, GENDER RECOGNITION AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Nov. 28, 2018) 
(forthcoming chapter for The Cambridge Handbook on New Human Rights: Recognition, 
Novelty, Rhetoric) (discussing the right to bodily integrity—sometimes derived from the 
right to privacy and from the right to be free from torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment—as one basis for a right to gender recognition). 
 39 See Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 33 (2002) (“As regards the types 
of ‘treatment’ which fall within the scope of article 3 of the Convention, the court’s case 
law refers to ‘ill-treatment’ that attains a minimum level of severity and involves actual 
bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Where treatment humiliates or 
debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human 
dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an 
individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterized as degrading and also 
fall within the prohibition of article 3. The suffering which flows from naturally occurring 
illness, physical or mental, may be covered by article 3, where it is, or risks being, 
exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or 
other measures, for which the authorities can be held responsible.”). 
 40 See HRC, 1950th Sess., General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during 
a State of Emergency, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
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The rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly have 
also been invoked.  For example, the Human Rights Committee held 
that the Russian Federation’s denial of a human rights activist’s 
applications to organize gay pride parades and picket in front of the 
Iranian Embassy in Moscow to protest against Iran’s execution of 
homosexuals violated Article 21 of the ICCPR.41  In another case, 
the Committee found that the Russian Federation contravened an 
activist’s right to freedom of expression, along with her right to 
equality and nondiscrimination, when she was arrested for 
displaying signs that read “Homosexuality is normal” and “I am 
proud of my homosexuality” near a secondary school.42  The ECHR 
similarly decided that laws prohibiting the promotion of 
homosexuality violated the right to freedom of expression in 
conjunction with the right to non-discrimination.43 
The rights to privacy and family life in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights44 and Article 17 of the ICCPR45  have, 
 
 41 Alekseev v. Russian Federation, Views, Human Rights Comm., 109th Sess., No. 
1873/2009, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/109/D/1873/2009 (Dec. 2, 2013). 
 42 Fedotova v. Russian Federation, Views, Human Rights Comm., 106th Sess., No. 
1932/2010, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (Nov. 30, 2012) (finding a violation of 
Article 19, freedom of expression, in conjunction with Article 26, equality and non-
discrimination). 
 43 Bayev and Others v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2017) (holding that the laws 
incompatible with the values of a democratic society, discriminatory, served no public 
interest, and reinforced stigma and prejudice); see Kaos GL v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2016); but see Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (holding that a ban 
the distribution of leaflets which are offensive to homosexuals to a secondary school is an 
appropriate limit on the right to freedom of expression); see, e.g., Ljubjana v. Slovenia, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) (allowing a greater scope for expression that might be offensive). 
 44 Article 8 provides:  
 (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.  
 (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 22. 
 45 ICCPR Article 17 provides:  
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
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either on their own or in conjunction with equality and non-
discrimination, played a particularly important role.  The right to 
privacy has formed the basis of successful challenges to the 
criminalization of consensual same-sex relations;46 the discharge 
from the Royal Air Force based on homosexuality;47 different ages 
of consent for same-sex relations;48 lack of parental rights49 and 
permission to adopt a child;50 and denial of relationship rights such 
as succession to the tenancy51 and pension52 of a deceased partner.  
The failure to provide civil unions or other forms of registered 
partnerships has also, more recently, engaged the right to family 
life.53  The acceptance of same-sex relationships within the notion 
of “family life” in these later cases is significant and allows the 
Court to address rights that arguably fall more squarely within 
public life and are not limited to the private sphere.  The rights to 
privacy and family life have also supported the recognition of 
 
reputation.  
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  
ICCPR, supra note 17. For an interpretation of this provision see, HRC, 32nd Sess., 
General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, 
Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1988). 
 46 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Norris v. 
Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); 
see generally Toonen v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 50th Sess., No. 
488/1992, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/WG/44/D/488/1992 (1994) [hereinafter Toonen v. 
Australia] (holding that criminal provisions in Tasmania violated both the right to privacy 
and the right to equality and non-discrimination). 
 47 See Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999). 
 48 See L. and V. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 39392/98, 39829/98 (2003). 
 49 See Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No.33290/96 (1999). 
 50 Fretté v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 36515/97 (2002); see also E.B. v. France, 
Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 43546/02 (2008). 
 51 See Karner v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 40016/98 (2003). 
 52 See Young v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 78th Sess., No. 941/2000, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (Sept. 18, 2003); see also X v. Colombia, Views, 
Human Rights Comm., 89th Sess., No. 1361/2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 
(Mar. 30, 2007). 
 53 See Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 29381/09, 
32684/09 (2013); see also Oliari and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 18766/11, 
36030/11 (2015). 
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gender identity54 and other related claims.55   
While the issue of same-sex marriage remains controversial, 
there have been signs of evolution.  The IACHR has been 
particularly progressive and, at the time of writing, is the only 
international human rights enforcement body that has 
acknowledged a right to same-sex marriage.56  Notably the IACHR 
opinion was based on an expansive interpretation of the rights to 
family life in Articles 11(2)57 and 17(1)58 of the American 
 
        54 See Lau, supra note 38; Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 
28957/95 (2002) (holding that the right of a transgender woman to marry in her acquired 
gender based on the right to privacy and the right to marriage). Goodwin did not challenge 
the lack of same-sex marriage in the United Kingdom at that time.  
 In Hong Kong a post-operative transgender woman also successfully challenged a 
policy that did not recognize her status as a woman for the purposes of marriage. See W v. 
Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112 (C.F.A.) (H.K.). The Court of Final 
Appeal favorably cited Goodwin when reaching this decision. See e.g., id. at ¶ 76. 
        55 G v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm., 119th Sess., No. 217/2012, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2172/2012 (June 15, 2017) [hereinafter G v. Australia] (holding that 
Australia’s denial of a transgender woman’s request to change her birth certificate unless 
she got divorced was an arbitrary interference in the enjoyment of her privacy and family 
rights).  
  In relation to the right to privacy, the Committee also noted that jurisprudence on 
“‘privacy’ under article 17 ‘refers to the sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can 
freely express his or her identity, be it by entering into relationships with others or alone.’” 
The Committee explained that “its established jurisprudence” clarifies “that this includes 
protection of a person’s identity, such as their gender identity.” Id.; but see Hämäläinen v. 
Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014). Hämäläinen v. Finland is discussed in 
more detail in Part III below. 
 56 See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25. 
 57 Article 11 sets out the right to privacy. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that: “No one 
may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his 
home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 11, “Pact of San Jose,” Organization of American States 
(OAS), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].  
 58 Article 17 sets out the rights of the family: Sub-paragraph 1 provides that: “[t]he 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the state.” Id. at art. 17.  
  In its Advisory Opinion, the Court explained: 
Regarding Article 17(2) of the Convention [which sets out the right to marry and 
raise a family], the Court considers that although it is true that, taken literally, it 
recognizes the ‘right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise 
a family,’ this wording does not propose a restrictive definition of how marriage 
should be understood or how a family should be based. In the opinion of this Court, 
Article 17(2) is merely establishing, expressly, the treaty-based protection of a 
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Convention on Human Rights and a substantive reading of the right 
to equality and non-discrimination.59  Although the ECHR and the 
Human Rights Committee have so far upheld states’ lack of same-
sex marriage, they have also introduced innovations and left the 
door open for a possible reconsideration especially in light of global 
trends.60 
While all of these norms, either on their own or in combination, 
have served to progress LGBT rights, their specificity may limit 
their capacity to address a broader range of claims.  As considered 
in Part III, equality and non-discrimination has a more extensive 
reach.  As both a principle and a right, it cuts across other treaty 
provisions and can support a more comprehensive framework for 
remedying the harms often experienced by LGBT persons. 
III. The Salience of the Right to Equality 
In some cases that arguably involve discriminatory treatment on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, international and 
domestic courts have nevertheless failed to employ a right to 
equality and non-discrimination.  Other times, although invoking 
equality, they have applied an overly formal discrimination analysis 
and missed an opportunity to further develop a substantive equality 
doctrine.  This limits the potential of human rights law to tackle a 
fuller array of rights violations which LGBT persons commonly 
confront and which frequently involve discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity, or a combination of 
characteristics.  Better actualization of rights requires a more 
comprehensive assessment of correlated discriminatory effects 
beyond formal classifications.  This can also enhance the 
precedential value of cases decided on the basis of equality and non-
discrimination.  For example, Lau observes that striking down laws 
that criminalize homosexual conduct on the basis of discrimination 
 
specific model of marriage. In the Court’s opinion, this wording does not 
necessarily mean either than this is the only form of family protected by the 
American Convention. 
See Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 25, at ¶ 182. 
 59  “States must ensure full access to all the mechanisms that exist in their domestic 
laws, including the right to marriage, to ensure the protection of the rights of families 
formed by same-sex couples, without discrimination in relation to those that are formed 
by heterosexual couples.” Id. at ¶ 218. 
        60 See infra Part V. 
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“affirms a nondiscrimination principle that can shape subsequent 
cases” including those “concerning issues such as partnership and 
marriage rights.”61  Basing such a decision on privacy grounds, 
however, “may not have the same downstream effects.”62   
In order to circumvent any dangers arising from a formal 
methodology, however, such an equality principle must be 
substantive.  As Fredman remarks, the United States Supreme Court 
refrained from an equality analysis when ruling that anti-sodomy 
laws in Texas were unconstitutional to avoid a possible “leveling 
down” solution.63  Indeed, formal equal treatment could still allow 
prohibitions of conduct (i.e. sodomy) by both different-sex and 
same-sex partners.64  Substantive equality, however, demands 
remedies that would dismantle such laws and ensure consistency 
with human dignity. 
Bearing this in mind, this discussion examines the content of the 
right to equality and non-discrimination in international law and 
explains its implications for the advancement of LGBT rights.  It 
notes that substantive equality, according to interpretations by UN 
human rights treaty bodies, requires a number of legal tools that can 
assist in ameliorating de facto disadvantage.  For example, an 
expansive approach to the prohibited grounds of discrimination that 
is non-exhaustive and includes intersectional realities can more 
accurately reflect the complexity of identity.  An equality doctrine 
must prohibit indirect as well as direct discrimination including 
measures that have a discriminatory effect even without intent.  
Courts should also recognize that differential treatment and 
discrimination are not necessarily the same thing; in other words, 
special measures may be consistent with equality while seemingly 
neutral policies may in fact discriminate.  Therefore, a robust 
evaluation of the legitimacy of differences is essential.  Dignity is 
also an important principle for diagnosing the consequences of 
stigma and prejudice and is therefore a key component of 
substantive equality in international law.  The following focuses on 
the legal position in global (UN) human rights law because of the 
 
        61 Lau, supra note 1, at 41. 
        62 Id. 
        63 SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 10 (2011) (citing Justice Kennedy’s 
language in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)). 
        64 Id. 
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special status of the ICCPR in Hong Kong constitutional law65 and 
the applicability of other international human rights treaties.66  The 
treaty-monitoring bodies for several instruments have, over time, 
clarified the meaning of substantive equality. 
Nearly all of the global and regional human rights treaties 
express a right to equality and non-discrimination.  The two general 
UN human rights treaties, the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),67  
which, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
constitute the International Bill of Rights, obligate states to realize 
all of the rights enumerated in these instruments without 
discrimination of any kind followed by a non-exhaustive list of 
prohibited “grounds.”68  Regional human rights instruments 
articulate similar duties.69  These are subordinate norms since a 
 
        65 See infra Part IV. 
        66 These include, for example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD). 
        67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
        68 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR states,  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.  
ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 2(1).   
  Article 2(2) of the ICESCR provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
ICESCR, supra note 67, at art. 2(2). 
        69 For example, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” Article 1 
of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that “[t]he States 
Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the 
free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination 
for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
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discrimination claim cannot be made unless the issues in a case are 
somehow connected to another right in the treaty.70  Article 26 of 
the ICCPR71 and Article 24 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights,72 however, are autonomous, standalone provisions which 
allow for application beyond the particular rights in the treaties 
themselves.73 
Global and regional human rights bodies have clarified that 
states must ensure substantive, as well as formal, equality.  They 
have elaborated on the elements of a substantive equality doctrine 
and the legal tools mentioned above in a number of ways. 
For example, according to the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the list of protected categories (race, sex, etc.) 
is illustrative, non-exhaustive, and should be broadly construed.74  
 
national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 
ACHR, supra note 57, at art. 14. 
        70 The European Court of Human Rights explains:  
As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive 
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since 
it has effect solely in relation to ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms’ 
safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not 
presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there 
can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one 
or more of the latter.  
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04 (2010) at ¶ 89. 
        71 “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 26. 
        72 “All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without 
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.” ACHR, supra note 57, at art. 24. 
        73 See F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, Views, Human Rights Comm., 10th 
Sess., No. 182/1984, ¶ 12.3, U.N. Doc. No. A/42/40 (July 23, 1985) (stating that “[Article] 
26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in article 2 but provides 
in itself an autonomous right. It prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the 
obligations imposed on States parties in regard to their legislation and the application 
thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the 
requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to 
those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.”).  
        74 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains:  
The inclusion of ‘other status’ indicates that this list is not exhaustive and other 
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Although sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly 
included, the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the European Court of 
Human Rights have read these characteristics into other grounds 
such as “sex”75 and “other status.”76  States must also prohibit 
discrimination on multiple or intersectional factors77 and on the 
basis of association or perception.78  A formal comparator 
evaluation based on one ground—often required in domestic 
discrimination law—can ignore the contextual realities of 
disadvantage that might be present in a given society.  In other 
words, “[e]liminating discrimination in practice requires paying 
sufficient attention to groups of individuals which suffer historical 
or persistent prejudice instead of merely comparing the formal 
treatment of individuals in similar situations.”79 
Two cases involving equivalent facts—Hämäläinen v. Finland80 
 
grounds may be incorporated in this category.” It adds that “[t]he nature of 
discrimination varies according to context and evolves over time. A flexible approach 
to the ground of “other status” is thus needed in order to capture other forms of 
differential treatment that cannot be reasonably and objectively justified and are of a 
comparable nature to the expressly recognized grounds in article 2, paragraph 2. 
These additional grounds are commonly recognized when they reflect the experience 
of social groups that are vulnerable and have suffered and continue to suffer 
marginalization.  
Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, 42nd Sess., General Comment 20: Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, para. 2), at ¶¶ 15, 27, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/20 (May 25, 2009) [hereinafter General Comment 20].  
75 See Toonen v. Australia, supra note 46. 
76 See, e.g., General Comment 20, supra note 74 (stating that “‘[o]ther status’ as 
recognized in article 2, paragraph 2, includes sexual orientation … In addition, gender 
identity is recognized as among the prohibited grounds of discrimination.”). The 
Committee cited its previous General Comments (14 and 15) as well as the Yogyakarta 
Principles. 
77 “Some individuals or groups of individuals face discrimination on more than one 
of the prohibited grounds, for example women belonging to an ethnic or religious minority. 
Such cumulative discrimination has a unique and specific impact on individuals and merits 
particular consideration and remedying.” Id. at ¶ 17. 
78 “Membership also includes association with a group characterized by one of the 
prohibited grounds (e.g. the parent of a child with a disability) or perception by others that 
an individual is part of such a group (e.g. a person has a similar skin colour or is a supporter 
of the rights of a particular group or a past member of a group).” Id. at ¶ 16. 
79 Id. at ¶ 8. 
80 Hämäläinen v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014). 
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(decided by the ECHR) and G v. Australia81 (decided by the Human 
Rights Committee) —illustrate how formal or substantive 
comparator analyses can produce different outcomes.  In both cases, 
the applicants challenged a requirement that transgender persons be 
unmarried in order to obtain official gender recognition in their 
acquired gender. 
In Hämäläinen v. Finland, the ECHR held that there had been 
no breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (privacy and family life) taken in conjunction with Article 
14 (non-discrimination) since, in the Court’s view, a transgender 
person was not similarly situated to a cissexual person.82  This 
identification of a comparator based on a single characteristic—in 
this case a cissexual woman—in order to prove differential 
treatment is bluntly formal.83  The dissenting judges in the case 
made this point when observing that: 
 
The difficult question … concerns the identification of the group 
to which the applicant and her spouse can be compared. The 
applicant argues that she has been treated differently vis-à-vis 
cissexuals, with regard to the refusal to issue her with a new 
identity card, and also vis-à-vis heterosexuals, with regard to the 
protection of her marriage to a heterosexual spouse. We regret 
that the majority rejects these issues simply on the ground that the 
applicant’s situation is not similar enough to that of cissexuals 
…84 
 
… we are not convinced that the applicant has not been subjected 
to discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in 
conjunction with Article 8 and consider that the Court’s examination 
should have gone into more depth in this regard.85 
 
 In 2017, the Human Rights Committee, on the other hand, held 
that requiring a transgender woman to divorce before changing her 
 
81 G v. Australia, supra note 55. 
82 See Hämäläinen v. Finland, at ¶¶ 111–12. 
83 See Peter Dunne & Dr. Jule Mulder, Beyond the Binary: Towards a ‘Third’ Sex 
Category in Germany?, 19 GER. L.J. 638, 627–48 (2018). 
84 Hämäläinen v. Finland, at ¶¶ 18, 19. 
85 Id. at ¶ 21. 
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sex on her birth certificate violated Article 26 of the ICCPR.86  The 
Committee interpreted the grounds of discrimination broadly, 
recognizing the intersection of marital and transgender status.  It 
explained that “differential treatment between married and 
unmarried persons who have undergone a sex affirmation procedure 
and who request to amend their sex on their birth certificate is not 
based on reasonable and objective criteria, and therefore constitutes 
discrimination …”87  The Committee essentially accepted her 
contention that she had not been granted equal protection 
“compared with a non-transgender woman or compared with an 
unmarried transgender woman.” She had, therefore, faced 
discrimination “on the basis of her marital status, her transgender 
identity and/or a combination of both.  Both fall within the concept 
of ‘other status’ in article 26.”88 
Commentators have pointed out that an overly narrow notion of 
identity, according to a formal, “grounds-based” methodology, 
could reinforce socially constructed identities and create 
assimilationist tendencies.89  This critique, however, does not take 
into account the more recent elaborations of a substantive, 
intersectional theory.  Traditional non-discrimination examinations 
have indeed emphasized single characteristics—being gay, lesbian, 
or transgender—and require comparisons with others who are not 
members of the same group, but who are otherwise similarly 
situated.  This is often problematic, especially when a comparator 
is not evident.  Substantive equality’s attention to the complexity of 
identity by addressing discrimination on more than one ground in 
combination, however, can mitigate these risks and strengthen the 
value of an equality and non-discrimination doctrine. 
 
86 See G v. Australia, supra note 55. 
87 Id. at ¶ 7.15. 
88 Id. at ¶ 5.1.2. 
89 See FREDMAN, supra note 63, at 11 (explaining the assimilationist tendencies of a 
formal “equal treatment” approach to non-discrimination. The need to find a similarly 
situated comparator “who does not share the characteristic in question  . . .  assumes that 
individuals can be considered in the abstract apart from their colour, religion [etc.]  . . .  the 
basic premise, namely that there exists a ‘universal individual’ is deeply deceptive. Instead 
the apparently abstract comparator is clothed with the attributes of the dominant gender, 
culture, religion, ethnicity, or sexuality  . . .  The result of the assumption of the ‘universal 
individual’ is therefore to create powerful conformist pressures.”); see also Lau, supra 
note 1, at 29 (discussing debates about identitarianism). 
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The Human Rights Committee has also clarified that 
discrimination encompasses discriminatory effects (indirect 
discrimination) as well as purpose.90  It confirmed that equal 
treatment is not always required91 and that differential treatment 
may not be discriminatory if the “criteria for such differentiation are 
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose 
which is legitimate under the Covenant.”92  Indeed, according to the 
Committee, “the principle of equality sometimes requires … 
affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions 
which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the 
Covenant.”93  States must also report on “problems of 
discrimination in fact, which may be practiced either by public 
authorities, by the community, or by private persons or bodies” as 
well as discrimination in law.94  
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has 
further built on these principles.  It confirmed that “[m]erely 
addressing formal discrimination will not ensure substantive 
equality.”  States are therefore obligated to “immediately adopt the 
necessary measures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the 
conditions and attitudes which cause or perpetuate substantive or de 
facto discrimination …”95  The meaning of discrimination includes 
both its “direct and indirect forms” and “indirect discrimination 
refers to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face 
value, but have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of 
Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited grounds of 
discrimination.”96  Like the Human Rights Committee, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also 
informed states that eliminating “substantive discrimination” may 
require the adoption of “special measures to attenuate or suppress 
conditions that perpetuate discrimination” as long as they “represent 
reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto 
 
90 HRC, 37th Sess., General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, at ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment 18]. 
91 Id. at ¶ 8. 
92 Id. at ¶ 13. 
93 Id. at ¶ 10. 
94 See id. at ¶ 9. 
95 See General Comment 20, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 8–10. 
96 Id. 
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discrimination.”97 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women,98 has explained that CEDAW also requires substantive 
equality.99  Its General Recommendation on special measures states 
that “a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not 
sufficient.”100  Indeed, “[u]nder certain circumstances, non-identical 
treatment of women and men will be required.”101  Furthermore, 
“[t]he lives of women and men must be considered in a contextual 
way, and measures adopted towards a real transformation of 
opportunities, institutions and systems.”102 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
monitoring body for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD), has reconceptualized substantive equality 
as “inclusive” equality.103  It sets out a four-dimensional framework 
embracing “a substantive model of equality and extends and 
elaborates on the content of equality.”104  The four elements of the 
model include: 
  
(a) a fair redistributive dimension to address socioeconomic 
disadvantages; (b) a recognition dimension to combat stigma, 
stereotyping, prejudice and violence and to recognize the dignity 
of human beings and their intersectionality; (c) a participative 
dimension to reaffirm the social nature of people as members of 
social groups and the full recognition of humanity through 
 
97 Id. at ¶ 9.  
98 The monitoring body for the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
99 See Comm. on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
[CEDAW Committee], General Recommendation No. 25, Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Temporary 
Special Measures), at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.7 (2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/General%20recommenda
tion%2025%20(English).pdf [https://perma.cc/KV67-ULAU]. 
100 Id. at ¶ 8. 
101 Id. at ¶ 8. 
102 Id. at ¶ 10. 
103 See Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 19th Sess., General 
Comment No. 6 on Equality and Non-Discrimination, U.N. Doc. No. CRPD/C/GC/6 (Apr. 
26, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 6]. 
104 Id. 
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inclusion in society; and (d) an accommodating dimension to 
make space for difference as a matter of human dignity.105  
 
The Committee further emphasized the significance of dignity 
to a substantive equality framework: “[e]quality and non-
discrimination are among the most fundamental principles and 
rights of international human rights law.  Because they are 
interconnected with human dignity, they are the cornerstones of all 
human rights.”106 
Although here the Committee is interpreting equality in the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in particular, 
these principles can be generally applied since they are consistent 
with the other treaty bodies’ deliberations and are likely to influence 
the right to equality in international law more broadly.  Indeed, 
human rights bodies have attempted (although not always 
successfully) to harmonize standards and avoid fragmentation of 
norms across treaties.107  The emphasis on disadvantage, effect, 
inclusion, and dignity could be especially helpful for considering 
LGBT persons’ experiences of discrimination, which are often not 
directly or explicitly based on sexual orientation but involve indirect 
discrimination and violations of dignity.108  
Once again, the various legal tools that can be utilized to 
promote a substantive equality model as articulated in these 
materials include: 1) expansion of the grounds of discrimination 
including multiple or intersectional discrimination, 2) prohibition of 
indirect discrimination, 3) sensitivity to context and impact when 
determining the validity of justifications for differential treatment, 
 
105 Id. This reflects Sandra Fredman’s model of substantive equality, see FREDMAN, 
supra note 63, at 25–33, which includes four overlapping aims. She refers to these as: (1) 
The redistributive dimension (breaking the cycle of disadvantage; (2) The recognition 
dimension (respect and dignity); (3) The transformative dimension (accommodating 
difference and structural change); and (4) The participative dimension (social inclusion 
and political voice).  She explains that substantive equality aims “to promote respect for 
the equal dignity and worth of all” and that it is “the dimension of equality which speaks 
to our basic humanity.” Id. at 19–25, 28. 
106 General Comment No. 6, supra note 103, at ¶ 4. 
107 See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, at 25, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (explaining the “strong presumption against normative 
conflict” in international law). 
108 See Lau, supra note 1, at 41. 
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and 4) developing the principle of dignity.  As noted above, these 
tools and the scope of substantive equality arguably enhance its 
precedential value when compared with other rights, such as privacy 
and family life.109 
Part IV first examines the significance of international and 
comparative human rights law within the Hong Kong legal system.  
It then reflects on how the concept of equality in international law 
has influenced the emergence of a substantive equality doctrine in 
Hong Kong and judicial approaches to LGBT rights claims. 
IV. Substantive Equality and LGBT Rights in Hong Kong 
A. Impact of International and Comparative Human Rights 
Law 
As mentioned above, courts have frequently applied 
comparative case law, including international human rights 
standards, when reviewing challenges to government policies that 
limit fundamental human rights.  Hong Kong, a former British 
colony, became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997.  Hong Kong’s 
constitutional document, the Basic Law, grants the SAR a high 
degree of autonomy including a separate, common law legal system 
and an independent judiciary.  The constitutional framework also 
incorporates international human rights standards.  Article 39 
specifies that “[t]he provisions of the [ICCPR], the [ICESCR], and 
international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall 
remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the 
Hong Kong [SAR].”110  The ICCPR’s continued application to Hong 
Kong since 1997, although the PRC is not a state party, is a notable 
element of Hong Kong’s autonomy.111  Hong Kong reports on its 
own to the Human Rights Committee which then issues Concluding 
Comments for the Hong Kong and Macau SARs only. 
The Bill of Rights Ordinance,112 a statute adopted in 1991,113 
 
109 See id.; Frances Hamilton, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage Before the European 
Court of Human Rights, 65 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 1582, 1586 (2018). 
110 Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 15, at art. 39. 
111 Id. at art 2. 
112 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383, (L.H.K.). 
113 See Richard Swede, One Territory: Three Systems? The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 
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essentially duplicates the text of the ICCPR and has now achieved 
constitutional status.  As a result, despite Hong Kong’s dualist, 
common law legal system which does not permit the courts to rely 
directly on international treaties unless they have been incorporated 
into domestic law, the courts have frequently cited materials 
produced by international and comparative judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions.  The Basic Law explicitly allows the courts to 
“refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions.”114  
Judgments rendered by the Privy Council, the UK House of Lords, 
and now the UK Supreme Court, have been particularly 
influential.115  
After the enactment of the Bill of Rights and even before the 
change of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong courts began referencing 
international and comparative human rights jurisprudence.  In one 
of the earliest of these cases, R v. Sin Yau-ming,116 concerning the 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the Court of 
Appeal pointed out that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, Hong 
Kong courts could derive guidance from other common law 
jurisdictions with a “constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights” and 
“decisions of the European Court of Human Rights” and 
international human rights monitoring bodies, especially the Human 
Rights Committee.117  While submitting that these materials are not 
strictly binding, they are “of the greatest assistance” and the Court 
would “give to them considerable weight … in so far as they reflect 
the interpretation of articles in the Covenant and are directly related 
to Hong Kong legislation.”118  The Court also explained that “the 
glass through which we view the interpretation of the Hong Kong 
Bill [of Rights] is a glass provided by the [ICCPR].”119  The Court 
of Appeal confirmed the importance of comparative and 
 
44 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 358, 359 (1995) (“[T]he Bill of Rights was adopted in 1991 in a 
response to fears in Hong Kong about the looming return to Chinese sovereignty, 
especially after the Chinese government’s massacre of unarmed civilians in Beijing on 4 
June 1989 ending the peaceful democracy protests in Tiananmen Square.”). 
114 Hong Kong Basic Law, supra note 15, at art 84. 
115 See Young, supra note 16. 
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international human rights jurisprudence in R v. Man Wai-keung 
(No 2) (Man Wai-keung),120 a case about the right to equality before 
the courts and tribunals, and set out a test that has since provided 
the basis for the development of the equality doctrine discussed 
below. 
Hong Kong courts are cognizant of their own contribution to a 
growing transnational judicial conversation about the meaning of 
constitutional rights.121  In QT v. Director of Immigration, a case 
concerning the denial of a dependent visa to the same-sex partner of 
a foreign resident working in Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal 
observed that “[t]here has been a notable convergence in the 
approaches of various courts, including our own, to what constitutes 
discrimination, influenced by international human rights 
instruments.”122  It then stated that “[t]he jurisprudence of the 
[ECHR] and its interaction with the jurisprudence of the House of 
Lords, the Privy Council and the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
relating to the Human Rights Act 1998 and domestic anti-
discrimination legislation are of particular relevance in the present 
case.”123 
B. Substantive Equality 
 
This section traces the growth of a constitutional equality 
 
120 The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.) (H.K.)  (“It was 
held in R v. Sin Yau-Ming⁠ . . . that in interpreting the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, this Court 
can be guided by decisions of supra-national tribunals such as the European Court of 
Human Rights, and that even greater assistance can be derived from decisions of the 
domestic courts in jurisdictions, such as the United States of America and Canada, which 
have constitutionally entrenched Bills of Rights. It was held also, that although the Hong 
Kong Bill did not contain a ‘justification’ provision similar to s. 1 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights . . . such a provision is to be implied. Finally, in addressing a challenge to a 
statutory provision on the ground of inconsistency with the Bills of Rights, the court in Sin 
Yau-Ming applied the rationality test and the proportionality test.”). 
121 See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 487 (2005); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: 
Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 
499, 516–29 (2000); Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 
Internationalisation of Law and Australian Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171 (2008). 
122 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324, at ¶ 30 (C.F.A.) 
(H.K.). 
123 Id. 
300 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
doctrine in LGBT rights cases in Hong Kong since 2006.  It draws 
on the insights about equality in international human rights law in 
Part III to explore the courts’ application of legal tools that 
strengthen a substantive model.  It concludes that these decisions 
have led to the elaboration of a fairly robust, if not quite explicit, 
substantive equality doctrine that could have significant 
implications for LGBT rights claims going forward, including 
same-sex marriage as considered in Part V. 
 
1. Prohibited grounds of discrimination 
As discussed above, an adaptable theory that recognizes 
disadvantage based on context as well as complexity when 
identifying the prohibited grounds of discrimination is an element 
of a substantive equality doctrine.  The courts have broadly 
interpreted the lack of explicit grounds in Article 25 of the Basic 
Law, which simply states: “[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal 
before the law,” and the non-exhaustive list in Articles 1 and 22 of 
the Bill of Rights, which duplicate Articles 2(1) and 26 of the 
ICCPR.  When determining which “grounds” are invidious, they 
have relied on comparative human rights jurisprudence.  
For example, in Leung v. Secretary for Justice,124 a case 
challenging different ages of consent for “buggery” and 
heterosexual intercourse as elaborated below, the Court of First 
Instance cited the Human Rights Committee’s views in Toonen v. 
Australia.125  This was one of the first times a Hong Kong court 
recognized that sexual orientation is a constitutionally prohibited 
ground of discrimination.  The Court also cited “a series of 
judgments of the [ECHR]” in support.126  In the same case on appeal, 
the Court of Appeal noted the government “accepted that 
homosexuality was a status for the purposes of Articles 1 and 22 of 
the Bill of Rights.”127  When invalidating the directly discriminatory 
offence of “homosexual buggery committed otherwise than in 
private” in Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, the Court of Final 
Appeal also confirmed that “[d]iscrimination on the ground of 
 
124 See Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 657 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
125 Id. at ¶ 45; see also Toonen v. Australia, supra note 46. 
126 See Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at ¶ 46. 
127 Id. 
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sexual orientation would plainly be unconstitutional” and “sexual 
orientation is within the phrase ‘other status’” in the equality 
provisions in the Bill of Rights and the ICCPR.128 
In these cases, the courts were inclusive, interpreting new, 
implicit, proscribed characteristics into the ICCPR’s non-
exhaustive list, in line with the human rights treaty bodies’ 
jurisprudence considered above.  While Hong Kong courts have not 
yet overtly acknowledged intersectional discrimination, their 
approaches to indirect discrimination and fluid discussion of marital 
status and sexual orientation in QT v. Director of Immigration 
(examined below) suggest a degree of openness to this aspect of 
substantive equality.  
 
2. Meaning of discrimination  
Another key feature of Hong Kong’s substantive equality 
doctrine is the acknowledgement that differential treatment is not 
necessarily the same as discrimination.  In Man-wai Keung, the 
Court of Appeal distinguished between “a discrimination, as 
opposed to a distinction.”129  It added that “given the nature of the 
[Bill of Rights] … [o]ne must look to the interests of society and to 
all the circumstances which the legislature had in mind when 
creating what the courts find to be a distinction amounting to a 
discrimination.”130  It cited the Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment on non-discrimination to explain that equality “does not 
mean identical treatment in every instance … not every 
differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the 
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if 
the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the 
Covenant.”131  This attention to context and the plurality of forms 
that discrimination might take has continued to infuse equality 
principles, especially in LGBT rights adjudication.  In these cases, 
substantive equality is reflected in both the courts’ recognition that 
indirect discrimination is unconstitutional as well as the nature of 
the proportionality test for establishing when differential treatment 
is justified. 
 
        128 See Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, at ¶ 11 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).  
129 The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at ¶ 33; see also General Comment 18, supra note 90, at ¶ 8.   
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a) De facto effects and indirect 
discrimination 
If differential treatment is not always discrimination, it follows 
that facially neutral measures might amount to discrimination under 
certain circumstances.  In other words, both direct and indirect 
discrimination are unconstitutional.  This can be helpful when 
addressing LGBT rights claims, which frequently concern 
discriminatory effects, but where facial classifications based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity may not be clearly drawn. 
In Leung v. Secretary for Justice,132 the applicant, a gay man 
who was under the age of 21, challenged the constitutionality of 
criminal provisions setting out different ages of consent for 
homosexual “buggery”133 and sexual intercourse between a man and 
a woman.134  The Court of Appeal explained that this was not formal 
“direct” discrimination because the age of consent for “buggery” 
between a male and female was also 21.  Instead it held that the 
difference constituted “disguised” discrimination in contravention 
of the right to equality in the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights.  This 
was the first time a Hong Kong court determined that indirect 
discrimination is unconstitutional.  The Court of Appeal agreed with 
the first instance decision that “[d]enying persons of a minority class 
the right to sexual expression in the only way available to them, 
even if that way is denied to all, remains discriminatory when 
persons of a majority class are permitted the right to sexual 
expression in a way natural to them.”135  
The courts have confirmed this approach in subsequent cases.  
For example, in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil 
Service, the courts contemplated whether Mr. Leung, a civil servant 
who entered into a same-sex marriage abroad, is entitled to the same 
benefits and allowances that the Government provides to the 
“spouses” of other civil servants married to persons of the opposite 
 
132 Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D.  
133 Id. 
134 See Crimes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 200, § 118(C) (H.K.) (“[A] man who – (a) 
commits buggery with a man under the age of 21; or (b) being under the age of 21 commits 
buggery with another man, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction 
on indictment to imprisonment for life.”). 
135 Leung v. Sec’y of Justice, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at ¶ 48. 
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gender.  The Court of First Instance decided that there was 
unjustifiable discrimination, reasoning that “although the 
differential treatment is, on the face of the matter, based on the legal 
marital status of the officer … it should also be regarded as being 
based, indirectly, on sexual orientation.”136  Although the Court of 
Appeal reversed this decision, accepting the government’s 
justifications, it acknowledged that the differential treatment would 
have otherwise amounted to indirect sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
In QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal (and 
the lower courts) similarly confirmed that indirect discrimination is 
unlawful.  In this case a lesbian expatriate couple claimed the 
immigration policy denying a dependent visa to the same-sex 
partner of a sponsor who had been admitted to Hong Kong to take 
up employment discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.137  
A different-sex spouse could have applied to join him/her for 
residence.138  At issue was “whether the policy constitutes 
discrimination based on sexual orientation … because of the 
differential treatment concerning eligibility by reason of marital 
status.”139 
The Court explained that the converging views of various 
courts, including the ECHR, on the meaning of discrimination 
includes general recognition that adverse treatment amounting to 
discrimination can take three forms.  The first two: “‘[l]ike cases 
should be treated alike, unlike cases should not be treated alike’”140 
 
136 See Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2018] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 84, ¶ 
53 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
137 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324, ¶ 29  (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
138 Id. at ¶ 142. 
139 Id. at ¶ 41. In QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal held it was 
not necessary to directly determine the constitutionality of the denial of a dependent visa 
for a same-sex spouse. Instead, it applied the weaker administrative law test of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness and found there was no reasonable connection between the policy and 
the aims it was trying to achieve. It therefore found no need to apply a stricter 
proportionality test. The court explained that “[QT’s] claim is primarily and sufficiently 
framed as one for judicial review on the basis that refusing her a dependent visa  . . .  
amounts to unlawful discrimination which is irrational and unreasonable in a Wednesbury 
sense.” Id. at ¶ 102. 
140 Id. at ¶ 6 (citing Lord Nicholls, Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, ¶ 9 
and Li CJ, Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, ¶ 19 (C.F.A.) (H.K.)). 
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represent a formal articulation.  The third “involves indirect 
discrimination where the measure complained of appears neutral on 
its face but is significantly prejudicial to the complainant in its 
effect.”141 
The Court of Final Appeal agreed with the Court of Appeal’s 
logic: “[s]ince all unmarried couples, heterosexual or homosexual, 
are similarly excluded, the Director has not singled out same-sex 
couples for differential treatment.”142  The policy nevertheless 
indirectly discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation because 
“a heterosexual unmarried couple may make themselves eligible by 
getting married if they so wish.  But a homosexual unmarried couple 
cannot do so because they cannot marry in the sense as understood 
according to the law of Hong Kong.”143  This element of choice, or 
lack thereof, is noteworthy and may factor into the courts’ review 
of upcoming cases concerning same-sex marriage and civil 
partnerships.144 
 
b) Test for justification of differential 
treatment 
The proportionality test developed by the courts for determining 
when differential treatment is justified and when it amounts to 
unconstitutional discrimination also contains features of substantive 
equality.  The Court of Appeal suggested such a test in Man-wai 
Keung, explaining that since “distinctions can be lawful” and 
“discrimination may amount to an unlawful distinction,” it is 
necessary to “look to the rationality, the reasonableness and the 
proportionality of the distinction or discrimination.”145 





144 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see infra Part V discussion about how 
Hong Kong should be distinguished from the European context since Hong Kong does not 
provide any options at all for legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
145 The Queen v. Man Wai-keung, [1992] 2 H.K.C.L.R. 207, ¶ 33 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
146 The test has three parts and requires: (1) The difference in treatment must pursue 
a legitimate aim. For any aim to be legitimate, a genuine need for such difference must be 
established. (2) The difference in treatment must be rationally connected to the legitimate 
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for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung.147  Again, consistent with Man-wai 
Keung and the Human Rights Committee’s position, the Chief 
Justice explained that if a distinction can be justified then it was not 
discriminatory in the first place.  In this way, he distinguished 
between the justification test for equality and that used for other 
constitutionally-protected rights:  
 
In requiring differential treatment to be justified, the view has been 
expressed that the difference in treatment in question is an 
infringement of the constitutional right to equality but that the 
infringement may be constitutionally justified.  This approach is not 
appropriate.  Where the difference in treatment satisfies the 
justification test, the correct approach is to regard the difference in 
treatment as not constituting discrimination and not infringing the 
constitutional right to equality.  Unlike some other constitutional 
rights, such as the right of peaceful assembly, it is not a question of 
infringement of the right which may be constitutionally justified.148
  
This observation contains the seeds of a substantive equality 
doctrine.  Since differential treatment aimed at addressing 
disadvantage would be consistent with, and not a prima facie breach 
of, the constitutional equality guarantee, special measures, or other 
remedies in cases involving de facto discrimination, might be 
necessary, proportionate distinctions and therefore valid.  Such a 
determination goes beyond formal equal treatment.  It requires 
attention to the real impact, disadvantage, and detriment 
experienced by members of marginalized groups.  The Court’s 
explanation suggests that the right to equality and non-
discrimination has an absolute nature: unjustifiable distinctions 
(direct or indirect) are always discriminatory and, therefore, 
unconstitutional.   
In other words, a deviation from equal treatment that is justified 
 
aim. (3) The difference in treatment must be no more than is necessary to accomplish the 
legitimate aim.” Sec’y for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo & Lee Kam Chuen, [2007] 10 
H.K.C.F.A.R. 335, ¶ 20 (C.F.A.) (H.K.).   
147 Li CJ also explained … that “[e]quality is the antithesis of discrimination.  The 
constitutional right to equality is in essence the right not to be discriminated against.  It 
guarantees protection from discrimination.”  He also links the constitutional framework in 
Hong Kong to the global context, and explicitly mentions the ICCPR.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
148 Id. at ¶ 22 (emphasis added). 
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is not an “exception” to equality but may be part of the substantive 
equality duty.  While the Court’s reasoning may not affect the actual 
outcomes of many discrimination cases in practice (formal equality 
may still achieve the same results), its substantive language 
nevertheless strengthens equality’s potential.  A substantive doctrine 
in Hong Kong constitutional law—infused by international human 
rights law—could support a range of discrimination claims beyond 
LGBT rights issues. 
 The Court of Final Appeal’s confirmation in QT v. Director 
of Immigration149 that the proportionality test would be applied 
more stringently in cases involving a marginalized group is also 
significant.  “The court will subject the impugned measure to 
‘particularly severe scrutiny’” in cases “where a person is subjected 
to differential treatment on any of the suspect grounds, including 
sexual orientation” which narrows “the government’s margin of 
discretion.”150  It added, citing ECHR jurisprudence, “[t]hat does not 
mean that the measure can never pass muster, but it will require the 
government to provide ‘very weighty reasons’ or ‘particularly 
convincing and weighty reasons’ to justify the challenged difference 
in treatment, applying the standard of reasonable necessity.”151 
 
3. Dignity 
As discussed above, dignity is a hallmark of substantive 
equality.  This principle is repeated often, alongside equality, and 
placed in a prominent position in human rights treaties and many 
national constitutions.  Cases involving discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, including some in 
Hong Kong, regularly refer to dignity.152  Although Hong Kong 
courts tend to mention dignity in a somewhat perfunctory manner 
 
149 In the end, the court did not actually need to consider the constitutionality of the 
discriminatory treatment but nevertheless held in favor of the same-sex couple by applying 
a weaker rational connection test. See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 
324, ¶ 29  (C.F.A.) (H.K.). 
150 Id. at ¶ 108. 
151 Id. 
152 See Michele Finck, The Role of Human Dignity in Gay Rights Adjudication and 
Legislation: A Comparative Perspective, 14 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 26–53 (2016) (noting 
that dignity has increasingly played a key role in the “evolution of gay rights,” especially 
cases concerning marriage equality). 
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and without elaboration, such judicial acknowledgement 
nevertheless signals an apparent appreciation of substantive 
equality and its relevance to the LGBT context.  It also sets the 
groundwork for fuller development of the scope and parameters of 
dignity as a nascent constitutional principle.  
For example, in QT v. Director of Immigration, the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal commented, “[i]t hardly needs to be pointed 
out that unlawful discrimination is fundamentally unacceptable.”153  
In support it cited Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe’s use of dignity to 
evoke substantive equality in R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions.154  He writes that “[i]n the field of human rights, 
discrimination is regarded as particularly objectionable because it 
disregards fundamental notions of human dignity and equality 
before the law.”155  He adds that discrimination is demeaning 
because it treats a person unfavorably on the grounds of sexual or 
racial stereotypes rather than on the basis of merit.156 
The QT v. Director of Immigration judgment also cites a 
reference to dignity by the Canadian Supreme Court in Law v. 
Canada,157 generally considered one of Canada’s landmark 
substantive equality cases.158  In that decision, Justice Iacobucci 
explains that “[h]uman dignity is harmed by unfair treatment 
premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not relate 
to individual needs, capacities, or merits.”159  He also clarifies that 
the constitutional equality guarantee in Canada includes substantive 
equality.160 
 
153 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 27. 
154 R (Carson) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 173, ¶ 49 
(UKHL).  
155 Id. 
156 See id. 
157 See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 107 n.137 (quoting Law 
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can.)). 
158 Patricia Hughes, Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational 
Constitutional Principle, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 5, 23 (1999). 
159 See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 107 n.137 (quoting Law 
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can.)). 
160 In Law v. Canada, the judge explained: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. 
It is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human 
dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or 
circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is 
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V. Prospects for Same-sex Relationship Recognition in Hong 
Kong 
This section contemplates prospects for judicial recognition of 
same-sex marriage in Hong Kong with reference to this emerging 
substantive equality doctrine in Hong Kong constitutional law.161  
Although to date Hong Kong courts have not yet deliberated on the 
issue of a constitutional right to legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships, they have occasionally emphasized, in obiter, its 
absence from Hong Kong law.  For example, and most recently, in 
QT v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal reiterated 
that “[m]arriage in [Hong Kong] is … heterosexual and 
monogamous.  By definition, it is not a status open to couples of the 
same sex, the right to marriage in Hong Kong does not make 
marriage available to same-sex couples.”162  It also noted that the 
“the European Convention on Human Rights does not impose 
obligations on states to grant same-sex couples the right to marry.”163  
This remark and the courts’ predilection to rely on the ECHR 
jurisprudence could foreshadow possible approaches to the 
 
enhanced by laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of different 
individuals, taking into account the context underlying their differences.  Human 
dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or 
devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all individuals and 
groups within Canadian society.  Human dignity within the meaning of the equality 
guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, 
but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when confronted 
with a particular law.  Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all 
of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?  
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), S.C.R. at ¶ 53; see also 
Sophia Moreau, Promise of Law v. Canada, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 415 (2007) (reflecting on 
the value of dignity as considered in Law v. Canada). 
161 For an earlier discussion of this issue focusing on the right to marriage in the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, see Michael Ramsden & Luke Marsh, Same-Sex 
Marriage in Hong Kong: The Case for a Constitutional Right, 19 THE INT’L J. OF HUM. 
RTS. 90, 90–103 (2015). 
162 See QT v. Director of Immigration, 21 H.K.C.F.A.R., at ¶ 25. 
163 Id.; see Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04 (2010); 
Hämäläinen v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 37359/09 (2014); Chapin and Charpentier 
v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 40183/07 (2016). 
  In W v. Registrar of Marriages, the court granted a post-operative transgender 
woman the right to marry her male partner in her acquired gender, the Court of Final 
Appeal clarified that “nothing in this judgment is intended to address the question of same 
sex marriage.” W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 90, ¶ 2 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
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upcoming same-sex marriage challenge.164  This Part therefore 
reflects on whether the positions of the ECHR and the Human 
Rights Committee—as expressed in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and 
Joslin v. New Zealand—are appropriate for application in Hong 
Kong.  Can they be distinguished?  What should the courts bear in 
mind when evaluating their persuasive value? 
Although a number of domestic courts have ruled in favor of 
marriage for same-sex couples, as mentioned above only one 
international human rights body, the IACHR, has identified a right 
to same-sex marriage.165  In 2002, the Human Rights Committee 
decided that the New Zealand Marriage Act, which defined 
marriage as between a man and a woman, did not breach the right 
to marriage in ICCPR Article 23.166  In a terse eight-sentence 
consideration of the merits, the Committee noted that the reference 
to “men and women” of marriageable age “rather than the general 
terms used elsewhere in … the Covenant, has been consistently and 
uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation … is 
to recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a 
woman wishing to marry each other.”167  It then refrained from 
analyzing the discrimination claim, or any of the other rights that 
had been invoked by the applicant.  As discussed below, this stark 
avoidance of equality may have been an attempt to side-step 
controversy and threats to the legitimacy of the UN treaty body 
process. 
In Schalk and Kopf v. Austria,168 the ECHR held that denial of 
marriage to a same-sex couple was consistent with Article 8 (family 
life) and Article 12 (marriage), read in conjunction with Article 14 
(non-discrimination) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Although the Court adopted an inclusive understanding of 
family life, extending its meaning to same-sex relationships for the 
first time,169 it also avoided a fuller examination of the 
 
164 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
165 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
166 See Ms. Juliet Joslin et al. v. New Zealand, Views, Human Rights Comm., No. 
902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40, at 214 (July 17, 2002). 
167 Id. at ¶ 8.2. 
168 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04 (2010).  
169 “[T]he relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a 
stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of ‘family life,’ just as the relationship 
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discrimination issue.  It relied largely on what it believed to be a 
lack of consensus among member states of the Council of Europe 
and applied a wide margin of appreciation.170 
A reconsideration of these decisions appears probable, however, 
for a number of reasons.  First, global trends are shifting largely in 
favor of same-sex marriage.  This could be especially influential for 
the ECHR’s position given its emphasis on consensus when 
determining the appropriate scope of the margin of appreciation.  
Their mention of the building of a consensus in Europe, a “tendency 
[that] has developed rapidly over the past decade” suggests 
possibilities.171  There was also notable division among the judges 
with three of seven dissenting.172  
The Court also acknowledged the strength of equality and non-
discrimination since serious reasons are necessary to justify 
differential treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation.  Falling 
back on the margin of appreciation doctrine, however, may have 
been a convenient way to avoid the controversy that a positive 
ruling based on equality may have generated.173  Paradoxically, by 
avoiding equality, the Court actually seemed to be signaling its 
appreciation of equality’s potential.  Indeed, had it utilized a 
stringent proportionality test to evaluate the validity of differential 
treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples with regard 
to marriage, the Court may have come to a different conclusion.  It 
 
of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.” Id. at ¶ 94. 
170 The Court explained that “[t]he scope of the margin of appreciation will vary 
according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background; in this respect, one 
of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of common ground between 
the laws of the Contracting States.” Despite recognizing an “emerging European consensus 
towards legal recognition of same-sex couples” the Court held that “[n]evertheless, there 
is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex couples. The 
area in question must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no 
established consensus, where States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing 
of the introduction of legislative changes.” Id. at ¶ 105. See generally, Dominic 
McGoldrick, A Defence of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application 
by The Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 21 (2016) (discussing the margin 
of the appreciation doctrine). 
171 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, at ¶ 105. It then decided, however, that there was still 
no established consensus, and therefore States enjoyed a margin of appreciation in this 
area. 
172 Id. ¶¶ 109, 115. 
173 See Hamilton, supra note 109, at 1588. 
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would have likely been difficult to accept the reasons put forward 
for justifying the differential treatment—the denial of marriage—
had it reflected on the requirements of substantive equality.  As 
discussed above, it would have needed to take an expansive 
approach to the prohibited grounds, provide a nuanced 
interpretation of the meaning of discrimination, pay attention to 
impact, and appreciate the stigma (dignity harms), and exclusion 
that same-sex couples experience when denied access to the 
institution of marriage. 
Some have suggested that the Human Rights Committee might 
also arrive at a different view if asked to reevaluate its position on 
same-sex marriage.  For example, Gerber, Tay, and Sifris argue that 
Joslin v. New Zealand is no longer “good law” in light of 
international legal developments since 2002 and human rights treaty 
bodies’ acceptance that core human rights treaties are “living 
instruments.”174  They maintain that the Human Rights Committee’s 
reading was overly narrow and not in line with the rules of treaty 
interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.175  
In 2013, Sarah Joseph observed that Joslin v. New Zealand had been 
deliberated nearly a decade earlier and predicted that “it is only a 
matter of time before the topic of same-sex marriage returns to the 
[Human Rights Committee]” and expected “a global tipping point 
to be reached, where the [Committee] will decide a similar case 
differently.”176  Indeed, if it applied its substantive equality doctrine, 
the Committee would likely have difficulty justifying the direct or 
indirect harms arising from the denial of marriage. 
In two recent cases involving relationship rights, the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal avoided a substantive equality analysis and its 
implications.  For example, although holding in favor of the 
applicant in QT v. Director of Immigration,177  the Court of Appeal 
introduced a categorization of “core rights” associated with 
marriage that could be shielded from judicial review.178  These core 
 
174 See Paula Gerber, Kristine Tay & Adiva Sifris, Marriage: A Human Right for All?, 
36 SYDNEY L. REV. 643, 644-48 (2014). 
175 Id. at 649. 
176 Sarah Joseph, Latest Case Law Trends: The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, CASTAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. L. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
https://castancentre.com/2013/10/28/latest-case-law-trends-the-international-covenant-
on-civil-and-political-rights/ [https://perma.cc/QDY9-T9WL]. 
177 See QT v. Director of Immigration, [2017] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 166 (C.A.) (H.K.).  
178 See id. at ¶ 11. 
312 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
rights would be immune from challenge even when direct or indirect 
differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation is involved.  
The Court explained that:  
 
There are certainly areas of life which are, whether by nature or by 
tradition or long usage, closely connected with marriage such that 
married couples should and do enjoy rights and shoulder obligations 
which are unique to them as married people.  The rights and 
obligations in these areas of life which go with the status of marriage 
must be regarded as core rights and obligations unique to a 
relationship of marriage, so much so that the entailing privileged 
treatments to married couples as compared with unmarried couples 
(including same sex couples) should simply be considered as 
treatments that require no justification because the difference in 
position between the married and the unmarried is self-obvious.179 
 
This somewhat awkward device appears designed to allow the 
courts some flexibility to circumvent a robust justification test—
already available in the context of LGBT discrimination claims—in 
cases involving same-sex relationship rights.  Indeed, the Court of 
Appeal affirmed in Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil 
Service180 that the “concept of core rights and obligations … was 
precisely an attempt to protect and ring fence the institution and 
status of marriage that is heterosexual marriage in Hong Kong.”181  
Like the ECHR and the Human Rights Committee, the Hong 
Kong court may be indirectly—and paradoxically—signaling its 
acknowledgment of the potential of the constitutional equality 
doctrine.  As in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria and Joslin v. New 
Zealand, if the court needs to apply a stringent equality review to a 
same-sex marriage claim, it is difficult to imagine that the 
government’s justifications—even to preserve the traditional 
 
179 Id. at ¶ 14. 
180 See Leung Chun Kwong v. Sec’y for the Civil Serv., [2018] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 84 
(C.A.) (H.K.). 
181 Id. at ¶ 3.  See generally, Po Jen Yap, Spouses without Benefits: ‘Ring-Fencing’ 
Marriage after W and QT Have Unbolted its Gates?, 48 H.K. L.J. 365 (2018) (discussing 
how the Court of Appeal’s decision in Leung Chun Kwong is inconsistent with its own 
precedent and the Court of Final Appeal). 
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concept of marriage—could be “weighty” enough.182  A dignity 
principle could also at the same time unveil the underlying stigma 
associated with this type of argument; an exclusionary reason for 
denying marriage based on prejudice would surely fall foul of 
substantive or “inclusive” equality as discussed in Part III above.  
The Court of Final Appeal in QT v. Director of Immigration rejected 
the lower court’s attempt to ring fence marriage rights, however,183 
and has therefore reopened possibilities for a stronger review of 
relationship policies based on substantive equality. 
The Hong Kong challenges can also be distinguished from 
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria for a number of additional reasons.  First, 
at the time of the decision, Austria had recently introduced 
registered partnerships for same-sex couples, which gave the 
applicants an alternative for recognition of their relationship short 
of marriage.  The ECHR noted that “[g]iven that at present it is open 
to the applicants to enter into a registered partnership, the Court is 
not called upon to examine whether the lack of any means of legal 
recognition for same-sex couples would constitute a violation … if 
it still obtained today.”184  If neither marriage nor registered 
partnerships had been available, the Court may well have come to a 
different conclusion.  In Hong Kong, however, there are no options 
for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships on the basis of 
equality with different sex couples.  The absence of choice for 
same-sex couples could be a determinative factor in the upcoming 
judicial reviews.185  
Furthermore, the European Court’s concern with consensus, 
which was the primary reason for its decision against same-sex 
marriage, is not appropriate in a domestic jurisdiction like Hong 
Kong.186  Hong Kong does not face the same demands as an 
 
182 For a critique of the Court of Appeal’s conception of traditional marriage in Hong 
Kong, see Marco Wan, Sexual Orientation and the Historiography of Marriage in Leung 
Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil Service, 48 H.K. L.J. 605 (2018). 
183 See QT v. Dir. of Immigration, [2018] 21 H.K.C.F.A.R. 324, ¶ 110(b) (C.F.A.) 
(H.K.) (“We do not accept that differential treatment requires no justification if based on 
marital status and if said to involve core rights and obligations unique to marriage.”). 
184 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 30141/04, ¶ 103 (2010) 
(emphasis added). 
185 See supra note 153 and accompanying text in relation to QT v. Director of 
Immigration.  
186 See Holning Lau & Derek Loh, Misapplication of ECHR Jurisprudence in W v 
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international organization made up of diverse member states.  Some 
have suggested that the European Court of Human Rights relied on 
consensus and a wide-margin of appreciation in order to avoid 
controversy and protect the Court’s legitimacy in a divided Council 
of Europe.187  Similarly, Langford contends that the Human Rights 
Committee in Joslin may have been trying to prevent a backlash at 
a time when a minority of states parties to the ICCPR had ratified 
the Optional Protocol allowing individual communications and 
shortly before two had denounced it.188 
There may be fewer apprehensions in Hong Kong about how 
rulings involving LGBT rights could affect the legitimacy of 
judicial institutions.  To be sure, Hong Kong’s constitutional status 
as an autonomous entity within an authoritarian state poses unique 
challenges, and some have noted worrying signs that judicial 
independence is under threat.189  LGBT rights, however, do not 
engage particularly sensitive political issues concerning Hong 
Kong’s relationship with Mainland China.  In a study measuring the 
Hong Kong courts’ degree of deference to the government when 
adjudicating human rights cases, Chan found that the courts have 
been less deferential when the right to equality of a vulnerable 
minority group is at stake.190  She also discovered (contrary to her 
initial hypothesis) that they have also been less deferential in cases 
 
Registrar of Marriages, 41 H.K. L.J. 75 (2011). 
187 Helen Fenwick, Same Sex Unions at the Strasbourg Court in a Divided Europe: 
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EUR. H.R. L. REV. 249, 259 (2016). 
188 Langford, supra note 27, at 119–20 (citing Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The 
Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 483, 517–18 (2001)).  See also Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of 
Individual Petition Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 
AM. J. OF INT’L L. 563, 564 (1998); Joseph, supra note 176; Gerber, Tay, & Sifris, supra 
note 174.  Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had recently denounced the Optional Protocol 
and therefore rejected the Committee’s competence to consider individual communications 
brought against them. 
189 For a discussion of particular challenges facing the Hong Kong judiciary, see 
Johannes Chan, A Storm of Unprecedented Ferocity: The Shrinking Space of the Right to 
Political Participation, Peaceful Demonstration, and Judicial Independence in Hong 
Kong, 16 INT’L. J. OF CONST. L., 373, 373–88 (2018) (commenting on the courts’ difficult 
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190 See Cora Chan, Rights, Proportionality and Deference: A Study of Post-Handover 
Judgments in Hong Kong, 48 H.K. L.J. 51, 66 (2018). 
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involving “moral controversy.”191 
Despite the strong equality arguments for same-sex marriage 
and reasons to distinguish the Hong Kong situation, courts may 
nevertheless uncritically follow the current position of the ECHR 
and the Human Rights Committee (however incorrectly reasoned 
and susceptible to a reversal).  Acceptance of a right to some form 
of civil partnership has a better chance of success, however, and the 
ECHR’s jurisprudence would more readily reinforce such an 
outcome.192  Rapidly changing attitudes in Hong Kong and majority 
public support for same-sex couple rights generally, including 
marriage,193 should mitigate any qualms that the courts might have 
about the need for societal consensus.  The more robust equality 
analysis in the IACHR’s advisory opinion should also resonate in 
Hong Kong, given the strength of the SAR’s constitutional rights 
framework and acceptance of substantive equality. 
VI. Conclusions 
This Article contends that a right to substantive equality and 
non-discrimination has significant capacity to further LGBT claims 
before international bodies and domestic courts.  Prospects for the 
eventual recognition of same-sex marriage in Hong Kong, or at least 
some form of civil partnership that grants rights consistent with 
marriage to same-sex couples, likely hinges on developments in 
international and comparative human rights law.  Whether the UN 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights 
revisit their previous positions in Joslin v. New Zealand and Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria could impact the outcome of future cases in 
Hong Kong and elsewhere.  As examined above these bodies have 
arguably not yet fully embraced the implications of the robust 
substantive equality doctrine elaborated in their interpretive 
materials at least with regard to marriage.  This untapped potential 
suggests possible legal strategies for Hong Kong and beyond. 
If Hong Kong courts do leverage the promise of their 
constitutional equality doctrine, they could contribute more 
concretely to the global convergence of LGBT rights norms (and 
 
191 Id. at 74. 
192 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
193 See generally supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing greater acceptance 
of LGBT rights in Hong Kong). 
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human rights norms generally).  This would not require 
inappropriate judicial activism and is unlikely to undermine the 
judiciary’s legitimacy or independence.  Courts in a number of other 
jurisdictions have already relied on substantive equality when 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage even in contexts where 
public support was more limited.194  A closer consideration of LGBT 
rights jurisprudence in Hong Kong may also contribute to broader 
debates about the effectiveness of international human rights law on 
domestic implementation and internalization of norms.195  Indeed, 
the Hong Kong cases illustrate the potential of international human 
rights law for the advancement of LGBT rights in domestic legal 
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